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MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
LUIS E. CHIESA*
This Essay compares and contrasts the American and civilian approaches 
to mens rea.  The comparative analysis generates two important insights.  First, 
it is preferable to have multiple forms of culpability than to have only two.  
Common law bipartite distinctions such as general and specific intent fail to 
fully make sense of our moral intuitions.  The same goes for the civilian 
distinction between dolus (intent) and culpa (negligence).  Second, attitudinal 
mental states should matter for criminalization and grading decisions.  
Nevertheless, adding attitudinal mental states to our already complicated mens 
rea framework may end up confusing juries instead of helping them.  As a result, 
jurisdictions without jury trials are better equipped to incorporate attitudinal 
kinds of mens rea into their criminal laws. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nathan Hall made his way down a steep and bump-filled ski slope.1  The 
Vail Mountain lift operator and former ski racer was skiing extremely fast with 
his ski tips in the air and his weight back on his skis.2  In order to get an added 
rush of adrenaline, Hall made his way down the slope without making any turns 
and with his arms out to his side to maintain balance.3  Unfortunately, he flew 
off a knoll and collided with a skier, killing him.4  Hall was charged with 
reckless manslaughter.5  Before the trial commenced, defense counsel argued 
that the charges should be dropped because the defendant acted merely 
negligently.6
How much should we punish the defendant in the Hall case?  While it is 
FOHDU WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQGXFW VKRXOG WULJJHU WKH LPSRVLWLRQ RI VRPH
criminal liability, it is unclear how much punishment is appropriate.  Given that 
WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWXQGRXEWHGO\FDXVHGWKHYLFWLP¶VKDUPWKHDPRXQWRI
punishment that should be imposed for the homicide will be entirely dependent 
on his mental state.  The more culpable his mental state, the more punishment 
he should receive.7  This, in turn, requires inquiring about what mental states 
should trigger the imposition of more (or less) criminal liability. 
This Essay analyzes the Hall case from the perspectives of both American 
and civilian criminal theory.8  The comparative analysis will reveal that these 
1. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 211±12 (Colo. 2000). 
2. Id. at 212. 
3. Id.
4. Id. at 211. 
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. I will assume that this is true both from a retributivist and consequentialist approach to 
punishment.  Note, however, that a consequentialist may have reason to punish harm caused with 
different mental states equally if doing so maximizes good consequences. 
8. See infra pp. 578, 583.  Civilian criminal law borrows heavily from German criminal law 
theory. See GÜNTHER JAKOBS, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL: FUNDAMENTOS Y TEORIA DE LA 
IIMPUTACIÓN (Joaquin Cuello Contreras & Jose Luis Serrano Gonzales de Murillo trans., Marcial Pons 
2d ed. 1995).  The civilian approach to criminal theory commands broad support throughout 
continental Europe, Latin America, and parts of Asia, including China and Japan. See, e.g., id.;
FRANCISCO MUÑOZ CONDE & MERCEDES GARCÍA ARÁN, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL (Tirant 
Lo Blanch ed., 8th ed. 2010); DIEGO-MANUEL LUZÓN PEÑA, LECCIONES DE DERECHO PENAL: PARTE 
GENERAL (Tirant Lo Blanch ed., 2d ed. 2012); SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE 
GENERAL (7th ed. 2004); CLAUS ROXIN, DERECHO PENAL: PARTE GENERAL (Diego Manuel Luzón 
Peña et al. trans., Civitas 1st ed. 1997); EUGENIO RAÚL ZAFFARONI ET AL., DERECHO PENAL: PARTE 
GENERAL (2nd ed., 2002); Félix A. Cifredo Cancel, La Intención y Otros Elementos Subjetivos del 
Injusto Penal en los Sistemas Anglosajón y Civilista: Hacia Una Teoría Unitaria, 63 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 
39 (1994). 
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2018] MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 577 
two legal traditions approach criminally culpable mental states in different 
ways.  Two particular differences stand out.  First, civil law countries 
distinguish only between dolus (intent) and culpa (negligence), whereas 
American criminal law distinguishes between purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence.9  By only having recourse to two blameworthy 
mental states, the civilian approach allows for less flexibility in grading and 
criminalization decisions than the American approach.  Second, culpable 
mental states in civil law countries place more emphasis on the attitude and 
volition with which the defendant acts, whereas American criminal law 
downplays the importance of attitudinal and volitional mental states.  
Both of these differences are likely to result in considerable disparities in 
how much we punish homicide defendants like Nathan Hall.  Regarding the 
first, if we were to try Hall in a civil law jurisdiction, the case would result in a 
conviction10 for homicide committed with dolus,11 or for homicide committed 
with culpa.12  This leaves the factfinder with only two potential conviction 
outcomes.  On the other hand, prosecuting Hall in a state like Colorado could 
lead to convictions for purposeful murder,13 knowing murder,14 reckless 
manslaughter,15 or negligent manslaughter.16  The Colorado approach to 
grading homicide²which is prevalent in America²allows for more conviction 
outcomes than the civilian approach. 
With regard to the second difference, the American approach to culpable 
mental states punishes conscious risk creation considerably more than 
unconscious risk creation.  In contrast, civilian criminal theory focuses on 
whether the defendant approached the risk created with a certain kind of 
blameworthy attitude.  On the other hand, American criminal law downplays 
9. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  These forms of culpability originate 
in the Model Penal Code. See id.  The older common law approach did not neatly define and distinguish 
between different forms of culpability, instead relying on the conceptually bankrupt distinction 
between general and specific intent crimes. See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American 
Model Penal Code: A Brief Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 335 (2007). 
10. The result could also be an acquittal.  For the purposes of this Essay, I only explore possible 
conviction outcomes, since disparities in these potential outcomes highlight the different ways in which 
American and civilian criminal law approach culpable mental states. 
11. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 423.  Civilian criminal law punishes a homicide committed with 
dolus quite severely. Id.
12. See ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 549.  Civilian criminal law punishes a homicide 
committed with culpa way more leniently than one committed with dolus. Id.
13. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2015). 
14. Id. § 18-3-103. 
15. Id. § 18-3-104. 
16. Id. § 18-3-105. 
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578 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:575 
the importance of attitudinal mental states, and instead focuses on the 
awareness of certain facts as the determinant of more or less punishment. 
In what follows, I explore the implications of these two competing 
approaches to punishing culpable mental states.  I conclude that it is preferable 
to have multiple culpable mental states than to have only two.  Bipartite 
distinctions such as that between dolus and culpa fail to capture the many ways 
in which blame manifests itself in our rich moral landscape.  Furthermore, I 
suggest that while attitudinal mental states ought to play a more salient role in 
apportioning and grading punishment, such an approach is difficult to 
implement in jurisdictions with jury trials. 
The Essay proceeds in three parts.  Part I discusses how the Hall case would 
be decided in America, with special emphasis on how the defendant would fare 
under the Model Penal Code approach to culpable mental states.  Part II 
explains how civilian jurisdictions would approach the case and fleshes out the 
doctrinal distinctions that would prove decisive in those jurisdictions.  Part III 
uses comparative analysis to shed light on the most promising ways of 
conceptualizing and sorting culpable mental states in homicide law and beyond.  
A brief conclusion follows. 
II. THE HALL CASE IN THE UNITED STATES
The defendant in the Hall case was tried in Colorado.17  Since the criminal 
laws of Colorado are based on the Model Penal Code (MPC), the analysis that 
follows is based on the framework for mental states and homicide offenses 
provided in the MPC.18
A. The Model Penal Code Approach to Mental States 
Prior to the publication of the MPC in 1962, American law revealed²as
the Supreme Court pointed out in Morissette—³variety, disparity and 
FRQIXVLRQ´LQWKH³GHILQLWLRQVRIWKHUHTXLVLWHEXWHOXVLYHPHQWDOHOHPHQW´RI
the crime.19 7KLVKDSKD]DUGDSSURDFKOHG³FRXUWVRIYDULRXVMXULVGLFWLRQV . . . [to 
invoke] terms [such] as µIHORQLRXV intent¶ µFULPLQDO intent¶ µPDOLFH
DIRUHWKRXJKW¶ µJXLOW\ NQRZOHGJH¶ µIUDXGXOHQW intent¶ µZLOIXOQHVV¶ >DQG@
µscienter¶ WR GHQRWH >WKH@ JXLOW\ NQRZOHGJH RU µmens rea¶´ RI FULPLQDO
offenses.20  It is unclear what each of these terms mean and how they differ 
17. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo. 2000). 
18. The approach to the mental state in homicide cases in non-MPC jurisdictions is briefly 
discussed in Part III(c).
19. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952). 
20. Id.
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from each other, if they differ at all.  At a minimum, these terms denote 
conscious as opposed to inadvertent wrongdoing. 
During the course of the twentieth century, many courts and commentators 
expressed deep reservations about the cohereQFHRIWKHFRPPRQODZ¶VDSSURDFK
to mental states.21  This dissatisfaction eventually blossomed into a desire to 
RYHUKDXOWKHFRPPRQODZ¶VKDSKD]DUGDSSURDFKWRmens rea in its entirety.22
A fresh start was clearly needed.  And that is exactly what the MPC delivered. 
The most influential provision of the MPC is arguably section 2.02, which 
defines subjective offense elements.  More than half of the states have adopted 
mental state provisions modeled on the MPC framework, including Colorado.23
This provision does away with the myriad common law mens rea terms, 
including notoriously difficult to define mental states like malice and general 
and specific intent.  The Code reduces subjective elements to four kinds of 
culpability, namely: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.24
Furthermore, the MPC approach to mental states is hierarchical, since it 
suggests that purpose is more blameworthy than knowledge, that knowledge is 
more blameworthy than recklessness, and that recklessness is more 
blameworthy than negligence.25  This hierarchical approach to mental states 
allows for more granularity in the grading of criminal offenses.  By allowing 
offenses to be punished more or less severely depending on the mental state 
with which the crime is committed, the Code allows for up to four distinct 
grading schemes for each generic offense.  This is most obviously the case in 
homicide offenses.  According to the Code, negligent homicide is punished less 
severely than reckless homicide.26  In turn, purposeful and knowing homicides 
are punished more severely than reckless homicide.27
21. Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
815 (1980). 
22. Id.
23. Id. at 815±16. States that have modeled their criminal codes after the Model Penal Code 
include: Illinois (1962); Minnesota and New Mexico (1963); New York (1967); Georgia (1969); 
Kansas (1970); Connecticut (1971); Colorado and Oregon (1972); Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, and Utah (1973); Montana, Ohio, and Texas (1974), Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, 
and Virginia (1975); Arkansas, Maine, and Washington (1976); South Dakota and Indiana (1977); 
Arizona and Iowa (1978); Missouri, Nebraska, and New Jersey (1979); Alabama and Alaska (1980); 
and Wyoming (1983). See Robinson & Dubber, supra note 9, at 326.  For Colorado¶s mental state 
provisions, see COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-502 to -503 (2012). 
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985).  
25. See id.
26. See id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d). 
27. See id. § 210. 
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580 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:575 
Turning to the definitions of the four mental states, a person acts purposely 
with regard to a result if it is her conscious desire to bring about the result.28  In 
contrast, a person acts knowingly if she is aware that the result is practically 
certain to occur as a consequence of her conduct.29  An example may better 
illustrate the difference between purpose and knowledge under the Code.  
Suppose that Matt places a bomb inside a commercial aircraft with the desire 
to kill passenger Jessie.  Although Matt does not desire anyone other than Jessie 
to die, he is aware that all other airplane passengers will die when the bomb 
explodes.  The bomb explodes, killing all passengers instantly.  Matt kills 
passenger Jessie purposely, for it was his conscious desire to bring about her 
death.  However, Matt kills the rest of the passengers knowingly, since it was 
not his conscious objective to bring about their death (he actually wanted them 
to miraculously survive), but he knew that they were practically certain to die 
if the bomb went off. 
A person acts recklessly under the MPC if she is aware that her conduct 
creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm.30  Contrary to what may 
seem at first glance, a defendant may act recklessly even if her conduct is not 
more likely than not to result in harm.31  More specifically, a defendant may be 
held liable for a crime of recklessness even if the risk created by her conduct is 
considerably lower than fifty percent and in spite of the fact that recklessness 
LVGHILQHGE\ODZDVFRQGXFWWKDWFUHDWHVD³VXEVWDQWLDO´ULVNRIKDUP32  Thus, 
for example, a person who points a gun at another and spins the cylinder 
knowing that only one of the six chambers of the gun contains a bullet acts 
recklessly if she fires the gun and kills the victim, although the probability of 
KDUPLV³RQO\´VHYHQWHHQSHUFHQW33  In addition to the creation of a substantial 
risk, recklessness requires subjective awareness of the risk created.34
A person who lacks awareness of the risk does not act recklessly, although 
she acts negligently if her conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk of 
harm.35  The risk created in recklessness and negligence is the same.36
Therefore, the only difference between the two mental states is that the reckless 
28. Id. § 2.02(2)(a). 
29. Id. § 2.02(2)(b). 
30. Id. § 2.02(2)(c). 
31. See, e.g., People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 217 (Colo. 2000). 
32. Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
33. Hall, 999 P.2d at 217. 
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
35. Id. § 2.02(2)(d). 
36. Id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d).  In both cases the risk needs to be substantial and unjustifiable. Id.
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actor is aware that her conduct creates a substantial and unjustifiable risk, 
whereas the negligent actor is not.  
Recklessness is a central concept in American criminal law, for it often 
defines the limits between advertent and inadvertent wrongdoing.37  The 
distinction is important, given that inadvertent (negligent) wrongdoing is 
seldom criminalized.38  Moreover, in the few instances in which inadvertent 
wrongdoing is punished, it is usually punished much less severely than 
advertent wrongdoing.39  Most state jurisdictions exclude negligent wrongdoing 
from punishment by prescribing a default culpability level that applies when no 
mental state is referenced in the definition of the offense.  According to section 
2.02(3) of the MPC, for example, the default mental state is typically 
recklessness.40  The practical import of this default rule is that criminal offenses 
may not be committed negligently unless the definition of the offense expressly 
states that negligence suffices for the imposition of criminal liability. 
B. Applying the MPC Framework to the Hall Case 
$FFRUGLQJWRWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI&RORUDGRWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWLQ
Hall created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death.41  Furthermore, the 
FRXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH³>GHIHQGDQW¶V@NQRZOHGJHDQGWUDLQLQJFRXOGJLYHULVH
to the reasonable inference that he was aware of the possibility that by skiing 
so fast and out of control he might collide with and kill another skier unless he 
UHJDLQHGFRQWURODQGVORZHGGRZQ´42  This, in turn, could lead to reasonable 
fact finder to EHOLHYHWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW³FRQVFLRXVO\GLVUHJDUGHGDVXEVWDQWLDO
and unjustifiable risk that by skiing exceptionally fast and out of control he 
might [kill another skier].´43  Given that there was sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the defendant both created an 
37. See id. § 2.02(2)(c). 
38. Leslie Yalof Garfield, A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A 
Prescription for the Legislature, 65 TENN. L. REV. 875, 879 (1998). 
39. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10). 
40. See id. § 2.02(3). 
41. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 224 (Colo. 2000).  The court concluded that the risk created 
by the defendant was substantial although it is statistically unlikely that an out of control skier will 
cause the death of a fellow skier. Id. at 222±23.  The court reasoned that even slight risks are 
³substantial´ if the magnitude of the interest that is put at risk is significant. Id. at 224.  Given that the 
interest that the defendant¶s conduct put at risk of harm (life) was significant, the court concluded that 
a slight risk of harm to an interest of significant magnitude was ³substantial´ for the purposes of a 
finding of recklessness. Id.
42. Id. at 223. 
43. Id. at 224. 
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582 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:575 
unjustifiable risk of death and was aware of the risk, he could be found guilty 
of reckless manslaughter as the crime is defined in the MPC and Colorado.44
In terms of the actual punishment that could be imposed on Hall, the 
Colorado homicide grading scheme nicely illustrates the MPC hierarchical 
approach to mental states.45  Since purposeful and knowing killings are²all 
things considered²more blameworthy than reckless killings, the former are 
punished more than the latter.46  Furthermore, given that reckless killings are 
generally considered to be more worthy of condemnation than negligent 
killings, recklessly causing death is punished more severely than causing the 
same harm negligently.47  More specifically, purposeful or knowing murder in 
Colorado could be punished with up to twelve years of imprisonment, whereas 
reckless manslaughter could be punished with up to four years of 
imprisonment.48  In turn, negligent homicide could be punished with up to two 
years of imprisonment.49
III. THE HALL CASE IN CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS
In order to determine how much the defendant in the Hall case would be 
punished in a civil law jurisdiction, one must ascertain whether he acted 
intentionally or negligently.  The civilian approach to mental states is binary.  
That is, it typically recognizes only two mental states for the purposes of 
44. Id.  While the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the defendant could be properly 
charged with reckless manslaughter and that a reasonable juror could find that he acted recklessly, the 
jury that eventually decided his fate convicted him of negligent manslaughter instead.  Colorado Skier 
Is Convicted in Fatal Collision on Slopes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2000, at A9.  Given that the risk 
created in reckless and negligent manslaughter is defined in exactly the same manner, the most logical 
inference that can be drawn from the verdict is that the jury concluded that the defendant was not aware 
that his conduct created a risk of death. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c), (d).  Had he been aware of 
the risk of death, the jury should have convicted him of reckless manslaughter, since it clearly found 
that the objective risk created by his conduct was substantial and unjustified under the criminal laws 
of Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104 (2015).  Note that given the preliminary stage of the 
proceedings when the Hall case reached the state high court, the court merely concluded that a 
reasonable juror could find that the defendant was aware of the risk of death he created. Hall, 999 P.2d 
at 224.  Eventually, however, the jury could also end up finding that the defendant was not aware of 
the risk created, which is perhaps what happened in this case. Id.  Given that the jury does not have to 
explain the grounds for its verdict, the precise rationale for the verdict will never be known. 
45. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-102 to -105. 
46. See id. §§ 18-3-102 to -104. 
47. See id. §§ 18-3-104 to -105. 
48. See id. §§ 18-3-102 to -104. 
49. See id. § 18-3-105. 
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2018] MENS REA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 583 
calibrating punishment.50  The most blameworthy mental state is that of intent 
or dolus.51  The less blameworthy mental state is that of negligence or culpa.52
There are three kinds of intent or dolus, whereas there are two types of 
negligence or culpa.53  Intent can be either direct or indirect.54  Furthermore, 
direct intent or dolus can be either of the first or second degree.55  A person acts 
with direct intent of the first degree when it is her goal or conscious objective 
to bring about the offense.56 7KLVLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHVDPHDVDFWLQJ³SXUSRVHO\´
under the MPC.  In contrast, a person acts with direct intent of the second degree 
when she does not desire the offense to take place, but she knows that bringing 
about the offense is a necessary consequence of her conduct.57 This is 
FRH[WHQVLYHZLWKWKH03&¶VGHILQLWLRQRI³NQRZLQJO\´58  Finally, a person acts 
with indirect intent when she is aware that her conduct creates an unjustifiable 
risk of harm.59  In addition to this awareness, acting with indirect intent has 
traditionally required a certain kind of attitude with regard to the risk created.60
In civilian jurisdictions, indirect intent is considered the most watered-down 
form of intentional conduct and LVRIWHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³dolus eventualis´61
There is no consensus regarding the kind of attitude that is relevant for dolus 
eventualis.  For some, the actor must convince herself that she would act even 
if the consequence of the act is producing the proscribed harm.62  The actor thus 
³DFFHSWV´WKHFDXVDWLRQRIKDUPDVDSRVVLEOHRXWFRPHDQGDFWVLQVSLWHRIVXFK
awareness.  For others, what matters is indifference rather than acceptance.  
According to this view, a defendant acts with dolus eventualis if she is aware 
that her conduct creates an unjustifiable risk of harm and she is indifferent as 
to whether the harm takes place.63
50. See, e.g., CÓDIGO PENAL § 1 arts. 5, 10 (2015). 
51. See ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 444. 
52. Id.
53. ROXIN, supra note 8, at 417, 423, 424. 
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. JAKOBS, supra note 8, at 321. 
57. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 423. 
58. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
59. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425. 
60. CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 271. 
61. Id.; ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425 n.25. 
62. See PEÑA, supra note 8, at 246.  This is the theory of ³acceptance´ or ³acquiescence´ to the 
harm. Id.
63. Id. at 250. 
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584 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:575 
In contrast, a defendant who is aware that her conduct creates a risk of harm 
but is not indifferent to it acts with what civilian scholars call conscious 
negligence.64  In such cases, the defendant actually believes that the harm will 
not transpire because she trusts that she will be able to prevent it by making use 
of special skills or knowledge.65  Therefore, the difference between a defendant 
who acts with dolus eventualis and one who acts with conscious negligence is
not whether she is aware of the risks created by her conduct.  The difference 
lies in the attitude that the defendant adopts towards the risk that she creates.  
In cases of dolus eventualis, the actor is not confident that she will be able to 
prevent the harm from taking place, and she does not care whether it 
materializes or not.  On the other hand, in cases of conscious negligence, the 
defendant is confident that she will be able to prevent the harm that is risked by 
her conduct. 
The following table illustrates the differences between the civilian mental 
states of dolus eventualis and conscious negligence and the common law mental 
state of recklessness: 
Mental State Awareness of 
risk created
Indifference 
towards harm 
taking place
Trust in ability 
to prevent 
harm from 
materializing
Recklessness Yes Irrelevant Irrelevant 
Dolus Eventualis Yes Yes No
Conscious 
Negligence
Yes No Yes 
Differentiating dolus eventualis from conscious negligence is essential to 
discriminating between intentional and negligent conduct in civil law countries, 
for dolus eventualis is considered the most watered-down form of intent, 
whereas conscious negligence is considered a type of negligence.  
Consequently, the difference between acting with dolus eventualis or conscious 
negligence is of significant practical import.  This is because in civilian 
jurisdictions, negligent conduct usually remains unpunished.66  Furthermore, 
when negligent wrongdoing is criminalized, it is typically punished 
significantly less than intentional wrongdoing.67
64. Id. at 306. 
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 549. 
67. See, e.g., id.
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As a result, the actual punishment that would be imposed in the Hall case 
ZRXOG GHSHQG RQZKHWKHU WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQGXFW LV deemed intentional or 
negligent.  He would receive more punishment if he is found to have acted with 
dolus eventualis (a type of intentional conduct) than if he is found to have acted 
with conscious negligence (a kind of negligence).  Note that whether the 
defendant will be punished more or less severely does not entirely depend on 
whether he was aware of the risk or not.  Even if he was aware that his conduct 
created a risk of death, he may be found guilty of negligent homicide under a 
conscious negligence theory if he was not indifferent to causing death.68
Although it is unclear whether the defendant in Hall was indifferent to the 
YLFWLP¶VGHDWKWKHUHDUHDFRXSOHRIIDFWVWKDWVXJJHVWWKDWKHZDVQRW  First, 
the defendant seemed fairly confident in his skiing ability and, therefore, in his 
ability to prevent the harm from taking place.69  Second, skier±on±skier 
collisions that result in death are extremely rare.70  Therefore, it is very likely 
that the defendant felt quite confident that a death would not result in spite of 
the risky nature of his conduct.  As a result, the evidence probably supports an 
inference that the defendant trusted that he would not kill a person while he was 
making his way down the slope.  This suggests that the defendant acted with 
conscious negligence rather than dolus eventualis.  If so, the defendant could 
be convicted of negligent homicide even if the trier of fact is convinced that he 
was aware that his conduct created an unjustifiable risk of death.71
IV. THE HALL CASE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Placing the Hall case in comparative perspective yields at least two 
interesting insights.  First, the MPC approach to mental states allows for more 
granularity in the grading of criminal offenses than the civilian approach to 
subjective offense elements.  The hierarchical or tiered MPC approach 
(purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence) affords more flexibility in 
gradating punishment than the binary (intent or negligence) civil law approach.  
Second, the MPC approach to mental states places more emphasis on cognitive 
mental states, whereas the civil law approach emphasizes volitional or 
attitudinal mental states.  As we will see, however, the MPC approach to mental 
states is sometimes supplemented by more attitudinal or volitional mental 
states, especially in the context of homicide.  In contrast, an increasing number 
of courts and scholars in civilian jurisdictions are downplaying the attitudinal 
68. See PEÑA, supra note 8, at 306. 
69. See People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 223 (Colo. 2000). 
70. Id. at 212. 
71. PEÑA, supra note 8, at 306. 
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features of mental states and redefining them in mostly cognitive terms.72  Both 
legal systems may thus be moving in different directions.  While American 
scholars sometimes flirt with giving more prominence to attitudinal mental 
states, civil law scholars increasingly highlight the importance of cognitive 
mental states.73
A. Binary vs. Multinary Approaches to Mental States 
As I point out in the previous section, the civilian approach to mental states 
is binary, allowing only for convictions based on either intent or negligence.74
Although the scholarly literature in civil law countries recognizes up to three 
types of intent (direct intent in the first and second degree and indirect intent or 
dolus eventualis) and two kinds of negligence (conscious and unconscious), 
only two grading scales are typically applied.  Therefore, if a defendant acts 
with any of the three kinds of intent or dolus, she may be convicted of 
intentional homicide.  If she acted with one of the two kinds of culpa, she may 
be convicted of negligent homicide.  The difference in punishment between 
these two crimes is significant.  Note that there is no third option.  The conduct 
is either intentional and severely punished, or negligent and punished 
considerably less. 
In contrast, the MPC approach to mental states is, for lack of a better word, 
³PXOWLQDU\´75  Instead of forcing the conduct into one of two categories (intent 
vs. negligence), the MPC allows for up to four different grading scales based 
on whether the defendant acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or 
negligently.76  In principle, then, the defendant in the Hall case could be 
convicted of purposeful homicide, knowing homicide, reckless homicide, or 
negligent homicide.  Punishment would decrease as one moves from purpose 
72. See CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 267; see also ROXIN, supra note 8, at 439. 
73. ROXIN, supra note 8, at 439. 
74. Thomas Weigend, Subjective Elements of Criminal Liability, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 490, 499±500 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2016). 
75. Weigend calls the MPC approach to mental states ³tripartite´ because it lumps purpose and 
knowledge together for the purposes of punishment and recognizes two additional categories of 
punishment based on recklessness and negligence, respectively. Id. at 499.  He does so in contrast to 
the civilian system, which he describes as being based on the intent/negligence ³dichotomy.´ Id. at
499±500.  While Weigend is right to point out that the MPC approach to mens rea is not based on a 
³dichotomy´ similar to the intent/negligence distinction, it is not entirely accurate to describe the MPC 
approach as ³tripartite.´ Id.  The description is inaccurate because the MPC does not always lump 
purpose and punishment together for the purposes of punishment. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(10).  
As a result, it sometimes functions as a ³quadripartite´ system. Id. § 2.02.  Furthermore, the MPC quite 
often lumps purpose, knowledge, and recklessness together, thus creating a ³bipartite system.´Id.
76. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
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to knowledge to recklessness to negligence.  Of course, jurisdictions are free to 
lump two or more of these mental states together, thus creating three or fewer 
grading scales.  Thus, for example, the MPC generally discriminates between 
negligent homicide, reckless homicide, and purposeful/knowing homicide.77
Negligent homicide is punished less than all other forms of homicide, whereas 
reckless homicide is typically punished less than purposeful or knowing 
homicide.78  The result is the creation of three basic grading scales for homicide 
based on mental states (purpose/knowledge, recklessness, and negligence).79
The upshot of this approach is that it allows for better calibration of the 
appropriate punishment in cases like Hall.  While in the binary civil law 
approach to mental states the defendant can only be convicted of intentional 
(more punishment) or negligent (less punishment) homicide, in the multinary 
approach to mental states adopted in the MPC, the defendant can be convicted 
of purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent homicide, with punishment 
decreasing as you move from purpose to negligence. 
It is important to distinguish between binary and multinary for both 
conceptual and pragmatic reasons.  From a conceptual point of view, 
overlooking the distinction between binary and multinary approaches to mental 
states may generate a mistake commonly made by those who try to compare the 
MPC mental states with the general framework for mental states in civil law 
jurisdictions.  The common mistake is to lump the MPC mental states into the 
civilian binary intent/negligence distinction.80  More specifically, one could 
claim that what civil law scholars define as dolus (intent) is essentially the same 
DVOXPSLQJWKH03&¶VPHQWDOVWDWHVRISXUSRVHNQRZOHGJHDQGUecklessness 
into one category.  The remaining MPC mental state²negligence²would then 
comprise the mental state of culpa.  While this seems to work at first glance, 
WU\LQJ WRJURXS WKH03&PHQWDO VWDWHV LQ DZD\ WKDW UHIOHFWV WKH FLYLO ODZ¶V
intent/negligence GLVWLQFWLRQLVLQDSSURSULDWHEHFDXVHLWWUDQVIRUPVWKH03&¶V
multinary approach into a binary framework that lumps together purpose, 
knowledge, and recklessness and contrasts it with a residual category of 
77. Id. §§ 210.2± .4. 
78. Id.
79. Id. § 210.2.  The MPC also punishes reckless killings that reveal gross indifference to the 
value of human life as severely as purposeful/knowing killings. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND 
COMMENTARIES, Part II, vol. 1, § 210.2 comment 4 at 21±22 (1980). Furthermore, it mitigates 
purposeful/knowing murders to manslaughter if the killing takes place as a result of extreme emotional 
disturbance (EED).  EED amounts to a partial excuse that mitigates murder to manslaughter without 
actually negating the existence of the basic mental state of purpose or knowledge. See id.
80. See, e.g., Cifredo Cancel, supra note 8, at 44. 
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negligence.  7KLV WXUQV WKH03&¶V KLHUDUFKLFDOapproach to mens rea on its 
head. 
For similar reasons, it may also be misleading to equate the civil law mental 
states of direct intent of the first- and second-degree with purpose and 
knowledge and the mental state of dolus eventualis with recklessness.  Doing 
so is problematic because both first- and second-degree direct intent and dolus 
eventualis are simply different versions of the same mental element²intent.81
In contrast, purpose, knowledge, and recklessness are not three versions of a 
more general mental element, but rather three distinct mental states, each with 
potentially different implications for grading criminal offenses.82
Distinguishing between binary and multinary approaches to mental states 
may also generate important practical differences in how cases are dealt with.  
Since civilian jurisdictions think about mental states in binary fashion, dealing 
with difficult fact patterns like the one presented by the Hall case is tricky.  The 
two options presented by the binary system are likely to prove unattractive to 
many.  Viewing the defendant as acting intentionally would arguably lead to 
punishing him too much.  ,Q FRQWUDVW ODEHOLQJ WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQGXFW DV
merely negligent could arguably generate too little punishment.  As a result, the 
binary approach may end up either over punishing or under punishing the 
defendant in the Hall case.  In contrast, a multinary approach to mens rea like 
the one adopted in the MPC may be better at avoiding over and under punishing, 
since it allows for three or more grading scales depending on the mental state 
that the defendant is found to have acted with. 
B. Attitudinal v. Cognitive Approaches to Mental States 
The MPC and civilian approaches to mens rea also differ in how much they 
emphasize attitudinal or cognitive mental states.  Mental states in civil law 
countries have a very strong attitudinal component.  In contrast, the MPC 
emphasizes cognitive mental states more than attitudinal ones. 
The textbook definition of intent in civil law countries includes two 
components.  7KHILUVWLVWR³ZDQW´WRHQJDJHLQWKHFRQGXFWRUEULQJDERXWD
result.83 7KHVHFRQGLVWR³NQRZ´WKDW\RXUFRQGXFWVDWLVILHVWKHHOHPHQWVRI
the offense.84 7R³ZDQW´VRPHWKLQJLV to make use of volitional capabilities in 
order to achieve a desired end.85  As discussed previously, civil law jurisdictions 
81. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425. 
82. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)±(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
83. CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 267. 
84. Id.
85. Id. at 269. 
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distinguish between three different kinds of intent.  The volitional component 
of the first kind of intent²direct dolus of the first degree²is clear, given that 
acting with this mental state implies having the purpose of committing the 
offense.86  It is more difficult to find a volitional component in the other two 
kinds of intent.  Acting with direct dolus of the second degree implies being 
aware that the offense is practically certain to occur.87  As defined, volition is 
absent in this kind of mental state.88  Awareness of the practical certainty of the 
existence of a given state of affairs is a cognitive rather than a conative mental 
state.  However, the majority of civil law commentators construe this mental 
state as a kind of intent that has a volitional component.  The views of Claus 
Roxin²RQHRI*HUPDQ\¶VOHDGLQJFULPLQDOODZVFKRODUV²are representative: 
Acting with dolus directus of the second degree implies 
³ZDQWLQJ´WRFRPPLWWKHRIIHQVHHYHQLIWKHFRPPLVVLRQRIWKH
offense is unpleasant to the actor.  The consequences of the 
conduct that the actor believes are practically certain to occur 
are considered part of the ageQW¶VYROLWLRQHYHQZKHQKHKDV
absolutely no interest in those consequences.89
The idea underlying the inference of volition in these cases is that one 
LQFLGHQWDOO\DVVXPHVWKHQDWXUDOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIRQH¶VFRQGXFWDVSDUWRIZKDW
one wants or desires.  Whether this assumption is warranted is discussed later.90
At this stage, however, what matters is that civil law courts and scholars go out 
of their way to find volition in this mental state.91
If finding volition in dolus directus of the second degree is tricky, finding 
it in dolus eventualis is even trickier.  It is clear from the civilian scholarly 
literature that²at least in theory²the three types of intent or dolus imply 
³ZDQWLQJ´WRHQJDJHLQWKHFULPLQDOFRQGXFW92  This, of course, includes dolus 
eventualis. %XWKRZFDQDQDFWRU³ZDQW´WREULQJDERXWDFULPLQDORIIHQVHZKHQ
she is only aware that her conduct creates a substantial risk that the offense may 
take place?  Cognition does not imply volition.93  The way in which civil law 
courts and scholars get around this is by supplementing the cognitive element 
of dolus eventualis with an additional attitudinal element. 
86. See supra p. 583.  
87. See supra p. 583.  
88. See supra p. 583.  
89. ROXIN, supra note 8, at 424. 
90. See infra p. 591. 
91. ROXIN, supra note 8, at 424. 
92. See infra pp. 590±91. 
93. PUIG, supra note 8, at 261, 268. 
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The result is that acting with dolus eventualis requires not only awareness 
of the risk created by the conduct, but also evincing a certain kind of attitude 
toward the possible commission of the offense.94  As was discussed previously, 
there is no consensus regarding the kind of attitude that the defendant must 
display in order to act with dolus eventualis.  Some courts and commentators 
assert that the additional mental element is satisfied if the actor would have 
engaged in the conduct even if she knew that the act was going to result in the 
commission of the offense.95  This version of dolus eventualis is frequently 
GXEEHG WKH ³DFTXLHVFHQFH´ RU ³DFFHSWDQFH´ WKHRU\ IRU LW UHTXLUHV WKDW WKH
GHIHQGDQW³DFFHSW´WKDWshe would proceed in the same way had she known that 
her conduct would result in the offense.96
Supplementing the cognitive element of dolus eventualis with a mental state 
VXFK DV ³DFFHSWDQFH´ EULQJV WKLV NLQG RIdolus closer to having a volitional 
component.  By acquiescing to the commission of the offense, the actor reveals 
that she would be willing to commit an offense if that is what achieving her 
goal requires.97  Admittedly, this mental state is not volitional in the same kind 
RI ZD\ WKDW DFWLQJ ³SXUSRVHO\´ RU ZLWK ³GLUHFW dolus RI WKH ILUVW GHJUHH´
However, the mental state of acceptance is not purely cognitive either, as it 
implies something more than mere knowledge or awareness of the risk.  At the 
very least, acquiescence to the risk in the sense required by the acceptance 
theory of dolus eventualis adds an attitudinal mental state that can be contrasted 
with the purely cognitive mental state of awareness of the risk. 
Some courts and scholars believe that the acceptance theory goes too far, 
for few defendants who engage in risky conduct would accept that they would 
engage in such conduct if they knew that the conduct would result in an 
offense.98  Instead of acceptance, they argue that the cognitive element of dolus 
eventualis should be supplemented by a mental state of indifference.99  Under 
this theory, acting with dolus eventualis would entail both being aware of the 
risk created by the conduct and being indifferent to whether the conduct brings 
about the commission of an offense.100  The mental state of indifference seems 
even more removed from volition than the mental state of acceptance.  To be 
indifferent to an outcome is not the same as desiring that outcome.  
Nevertheless, the mental state of indifference is not purely cognitive either, as 
94. See infra p. 591±92. 
95. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 425. 
96. Id. at 430. 
97. Id. at 431. 
98. See infra p. 591±92. 
99. Id.
100. Id.
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it demonstrates that the defendant has a certain kind of attitude towards the risk 
that she is creating. 
In sum, supplementing the cognitive mental state of awareness of the risk 
with a mental state such as acceptance or indifference adds a non-cognitive 
dimension to dolus eventualis.  Although it is a stretch to state²as civil law 
scholars often do²that mental states like acceptance and indifference reflect 
volition, it is accurate to assert that such mental states add an attitudinal 
component to dolus eventualis that is generally absent in the imperfect Anglo-
American analogue to dolus eventualis (recklessness).
This emphasis on attitudes constitutes one of the distinguishing features of 
the civilian approach to mental states.  7RDFW³LQWHQWLRQDOO\´LVWRDFWZLWKD
certain non-cognitive mental state, whether it be purpose (direct dolus of the 
first degree), assumption of the consequences (direct dolus of the second 
degree), or indifference (dolus eventualis).101  In contrast, to act with culpa is 
to act with a different, non-FRJQLWLYHPHQWDO VWDWH VXFKDV ³WUXVWLQJ LQRQH¶V
DELOLW\ WR SUHYHQW WKH KDUP´ FRQVFLRXV QHJOLJHQFH RU VLPSO\ D IDLOXUH WR
perceive the harm (unconscious negligence).102  The civilian approach leads to 
different grading scaOHV EDVHG RQ WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DWWLWXGH UDWKHU WKDQ WKH
GHIHQGDQW¶VDZDUHQHVVRIWKHULVN If the defendant is indifferent to the harm, 
she will be punished quite severely.103  However, if she is merely aware of the 
harm but not indifferent to it, she will be punished considerably less severely 
even if she is aware of the risk.104
7KH³DWWLWXGLQDO´DSSURDFKWRPHQWDOVWDWHVSUHYDOHQWLQFLYLOODZFRXQWULHV
can be contrasted with the more cognitive approach to mental states that was 
adopted in many American states after the publication of the MPC.  According 
to the MPC, actors who are aware of the risk that their conduct creates are 
generally punished much more than actors who are unaware of the risk that their 
conduct creates.105  Awareness and non-awareness marks the difference 
between recklessness and negligence.106  The latter is punished often and 
considerably, while the former is punished infrequently and more leniently.  
Contrary to what is the case in civil law countries, as long as the actor is aware 
of the risk she creates, it is generally irrelevant to liability whether she is 
101. Id. at 417, 423, 425. 
102. ZAFFARONI ET AL., supra note 8, at 549. 
103. Defendant in this case would be punished for an ³intentional´ offense based on dolus 
eventualis.
104. Defendant in this case would be punished for a ³negligent´ offense based on a theory of 
conscious negligence. 
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2±210.4 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
106. Id. § 2.02(c), (d). 
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indifferent to the risk or not.107  The emphasis is on cognitive mental states 
rather than on attitudinal ones. 
Comparison of the civilian and MPC views of mental states raises an 
important question for criminal punishment.  Should we focus on cognitive or 
attitudinal mental states when making basic punishment decisions on the basis 
of culpability?  By and large, civil law countries make basic punishment 
distinctions based on attitudinal mental states such as indifference or lack of 
indifference.  In contrast, the MPC generally makes such punishment decisions 
based on cognitive criteria such as awareness or lack of awareness of a risk. 
C. Convergence in MPC and Civilian Approaches to Mental States 
While the trend in the United States is to emphasize cognitive mental states, 
there are some instances in which attitudinal mental states are emphasized.  By 
the same token, while most civil law courts and scholars generally focus on 
attitudinal mental states in order to make basic punishment decisions, some 
commentators and courts are advocating for a more cognitive approach to 
mental states.108
The most glaring instance in which American criminal law makes use of 
attitudinal mental states to make basic grading distinctions in criminal offenses 
is in the law of murder.  7KHFRPPRQODZGHILQLWLRQRIPXUGHULV³WKHXQODZIXO
killing of a human being ZLWKPDOLFHDIRUHWKRXJKW´109  In the context of the 
common law definition of murder, a prosecutor may prove malice by showing 
that the defendant had: 
(1) intent to kill; 
(2) intent to cause serious bodily injury; 
D³GHSUDYHGKHDUW´RUH[WUHPHLQGLIIHUHQce to the value of 
human life; or by proving 
(4) felony murder.110
The most problematic kind of malice is that of so-called depraved heart 
murder.  The problem arises because it is difficult to distinguish between 
reckless killings that do not evince a depraved heart and reckless killings that 
do.  While the latter would be classified as murder, the former would only give 
rise to liability for manslaughter.111  As one court observed, the kind of 
recklessness that triggers liability for depraved heart murder is frequently 
107. Indifference does seem to be relevant to a murder charge under the MPC. See supra p. 588. 
108. See generally PUIG, supra note 8, at 259±70. 
109. Simpkins v. State, 596 A.2d 655, 661 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991). 
110. Id. at 657. 
111. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2(1)(b), 210.3(1)(b). 
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described as conduct that reveals extreme indifference to human life.112
7KHUHIRUH WKH FRXUW SRLQWHG RXW WKDW ³>W@KH SHUSHWUDWRUPXVW >RU UHDVRQDEO\
should] realize the risk his behavior has created to the extent that his conduct 
may be termed wLOOIXO´113 )XUWKHUPRUH³WKHFRQGXFWPXVWFRQWDLQDQHOHPHQW
of viciousness or contemptuous disregard for the value of human life which 
FRQGXFWFKDUDFWHUL]HVWKDWEHKDYLRUDVZDQWRQ´114  The issue has vexed courts 
for decades. 
One court explained that the difference between depraved heart 
recklessness and standard recklessness is that depraved heart murder involves 
a higher degree of recklessness from which malice or deliberate design may be 
implied.115  Ultimately, it appears that depraved heart murders are simply 
NLOOLQJV LQ ZKLFK WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V UHFNOHVVQHVV LV VR FXOSDEOH WKDW LW FDQ EH
equated with purposeful killings in terms of blameworthiness.  A more specific 
definition is, however, elusive. 
Even if a precise definition of depraved heart murder eludes us, it is clear 
that this mental state may allow for attitudinal considerations that are otherwise 
irrelevant under the purely cognitive mental state of recklessness.  Depraved 
KHDUWPD\WKXVEHFRQFHLYHGDVDNLQGRI³UHFNOHVVQHVVplus´WKDWVXSSOHPHQWV
the basic awareness of risk that characterizes simple recklessness with an 
attitudinal mental state of indifference.  The similarities between the common 
law mental state of depraved heart and the civil law mental state of dolus 
eventualis are undeniable. 
Although the MPC eschews malice from its definition of murder, the kinds 
of killings that may give rise to murder liability under the Code are quite similar 
to those that would give rise to murder liability at common law.  The MPC 
defines murder as purposely or knowingly killing a human being.116
Interestingly, it is also murder to recklessly kill a human being in circumstances 
that manifest ³extreme indifference to the value of human life.´117  The MPC¶s
inclusion of this mental state (recklessness plus gross indifference) stands out, 
as section 2.02 only recognizes four mental states (purposely, knowingly, 
recklessly, and negligently).118
112. Simpkins, 596 A.2d at 657. 
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2. 
117. Id.
118. See id. § 2.02. 
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The line between standard recklessness and recklessness with gross 
indifference to human life is fuzzy.  That the line is difficult to draw in this 
context is worrying, given that purely reckless killings amount to the lesser 
offense of manslaughter, whereas reckless killings with gross indifference 
amount to the much more serious offense of murder.119  The drafters of the MPC 
suggest that the difference between these two mental states is normative.120
Reckless killings should trigger murder liability if the circumstances 
surrounding the act suggest that the killing is as worthy of condemnation as a 
purposeful or knowing killing.  In contrast, the killing should be considered 
manslaughter if the circumstances surrounding the act reveal that it is not as 
blameworthy as purposeful and knowing killings.121
/LNHLWVFRPPRQODZDQDORJXHRIGHSUDYHGKHDUWPXUGHUWKH03&¶VPHQWDO
state of recklessness supplemented by gross indifference to the value of human 
life shares many features of the civil law mental state of dolus eventualis.  More 
specifically, it reveals an openness to give more weight to attitudinal mental 
states than what section 2.02 of the Code would suggest, at least in the context 
of very serious offenses such as murder.122  Some scholars celebrate this 
attitudinal component of depraved heart murder and suggest that the element of 
indifference should be the cornerstone of homicide offenses.123  Others argue 
that the attitudinal model that is highlighted by depraved heart murder should 
be extended to other contexts.124  It is unclear whether this emphasis on 
attitudinal mental states will spread to offenses other than murder.  If it does, it 
will bring the Anglo-American and civilian approaches to mental states closer 
together. 
Interestingly, while some American criminal theorists call for a more 
widespread use of the attitudinal approach to mental states that lies at the heart 
of depraved murder, a growing number of civil law scholars are arguing for a 
rejection of attitudinal mental states.125  In recent years the civil law distinction 
between dolus eventualis and conscious negligence is being called into 
119. See id. §§ 210.2±210.3. 
120. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, Part II, vol. 1 § 210.2 comment 4 at 21±
22 (1980). 
121. See id. at 22. 
122. The Code also makes reference to recklessness with gross indifference in the crime of 
assault and battery. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(a). 
123. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Criminal Homicide Statutes: Giving Juries More 
Discretion, 47 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 89, 97±98 (2014). 
124. Alan C. Michaels, Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 961 
(1998). 
125. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 435. 
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question.126  The charge is led mostly by the civilian courts and scholars that 
defend the so-called probability theory of dolus eventualis.127  According to this 
theory, a defendant acts with dolus eventualis when she accurately perceives 
the danger created by her conduct and acts in spite of having such awareness.128
In contrast, a defendant acts with conscious negligence when she fails to 
correctly assess the danger created by her conduct.129  In its most extreme 
version, the theory leads to a finding of intent whenever the actor is aware that 
her conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm.  Many scholars throughout 
the civil law realm have endorsed a version of this theory of dolus eventualis.130
Some courts are starting to follow suit.131  If this trend continues, the differences 
between the civil law mental state of dolus eventualis DQGWKH03&¶VPHQWDO
state of recklessness will become less meaningful. 
D. Competing Approaches to Mental States: Expressing Autonomy vs. 
Controlling Risk 
Why do civilian legal traditions focus more on attitudinal mental states than 
the Anglo-American jurisdictions influenced by the more cognitive MPC 
approach?  Why do civil law countries approach mental states in binary fashion, 
whereas the MPC prefers a multinary approach to subjective offense elements? 
One way of answering these questions is by positing that the civil law 
approach to mental states is primarily concerned with expressing autonomy, 
while the MPC approach is primarily concerned with controlling or minimizing 
risk.  It is difficult to make sense of civilian criminal law theory without taking 
into account the significant role that autonomy plays in the system.  As a result, 
it is often stated in civil law jurisdictions that the legitimacy of criminal law is 
to a significant extent dependent on whether doctrines of criminal law respect 
individual autonomy.132  Take, for example, the civil law approach to 
criminalization.  Most civilian scholars argue that it is legitimate to criminalize 
conduct only if doing so is necessary to protect so-called legal goods.133  Legal 
126. See, e.g., id.
127. See, e.g., id.
128. See PUIG, supra note 8, at 267±68. 
129. Id.
130. In Spain, see for example, id. at 267±68, 267 n.75, 268 nn.76±77. In Germany, see for 
example JAKOBS, supra note 8, at 329. 
131. Spanish courts, for example, seem to be slowly moving in this direction. See PUIG, supra
note 8, at 278, 278 n.104. 
132. See, e.g., Thomas Weigend, Societas Delinquere Non Potest? A German Perspective, 6 J.
INT¶L CRIM. JUST. 927, 937 (2008). 
133. CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 59. 
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goods are often defined as those interests that are necessary for human beings 
WR³IUHHO\GHYHORSWKHLUSHUVRQDOLW\´134  That is, conduct should be criminalized 
LI GRLQJ VR IXUWKHUV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V FDSDFLW\ IRU IUHHGRP RU DXWRQRP\135
6LPLODUO\PRVWFLYLOODZFRXUWVDQGVFKRODUVKROGWKDWWKHYLFWLP¶VYROXQWDU\
DVVXPSWLRQRIULVNVHYHUVWKHFDXVDOOLQNEHWZHHQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶Vact and the 
harm suffered by the victim because by doing so we recognize the victim as an 
autonomous agent who is free to decide whether to engage in risky conduct.136
The civilian approach to the necessity or lesser evils defense also significantly 
emphasizes autonomy.  Therefore, it is typically considered unlawful in civil 
law jurisdictions to sacrifice the interests of an individual in order to increase 
the welfare of an even greater number of people because doing so obliterates 
the autonomy of the sacrificed individual.137  In doing so, we objectify the 
individual by treating her as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself.  
This is considered illegitimate because it negates individual autonomy.  A final 
example is the general skepticism with which corporate criminal liability is met 
in civil law jurisdictions.  Imposing criminal liability on corporate actors is 
often viewed as inappropriate because corporations are not capable of behaving 
culpably since they are not moral agents endowed with the capacity for making 
autonomous choices.138
In contrast to the civil law autonomy-centered approach to criminal justice, 
the MPC emphasizes control and mitigation of risky conduct over the protection 
of autonomy.139  Therefore, it is often viewed as legitimate to criminalize risk 
FUHDWLRQ HYHQ LI DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V DXWRQRP\ LV QRW FRPSURPLVHG E\ WKH
conduct.140 6LPLODUO\ WKH YLFWLP¶V YROXQWDU\ GHFLVLRQ WR HQJDJH LQ ULVN\
conduct is often ignored in the proximate causation analysis in order to hold the 
defendant liable.  Although this approach to causation downplays the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHYLFWLP¶VDXWRQRPRXVFKRLFHLWGLVFRXUDJHVIXWXUHGHIHQGDQWV
from proposing risky endeavors that are of little social value.141  Anglo-
American criminal law is also much more open to sacrificing an individual in 
order to maximize the welfare of many others.142  Once again, the emphasis in 
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.  
137. See CONDE & ARÁN, supra note 8, at 59. 
138. Weigend, supra note 132, at 936. 
139. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
140. See, e.g., id.
141. This is what we do when we criminalize risky conduct such as playing Russian roulette. 
142. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 49 (1881VWDWLQJWKDWODZ³LVUeady 
to sacrifice the individual so far as necessary in order to accomplish [its purpose]). 
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these cases is placed on minimizing risks to others rather than on protecting 
autonomy.  Finally, corporate criminal liability is readily accepted in common 
law jurisdictions as the driving force behind punishing corporate actors is to 
deter corporations from engaging in risky conduct rather than expressing 
condemnation for the autonomous choices of the corporation.143
It is in this context that the differences between the civil and common law 
approaches to mental states can best be explained.  The civilian model of mens 
rea is primarily concerned with expressing condemnation for autonomously 
and voluntarily choosing to do wrong.  As a result, punishment is primarily 
imposed for choosing to do wrong rather than for consciously risking wrong.  
This explains the binary nature of the civil law approach to mental states.  An 
individual either chooses to do wrong or not.  When it comes to choosing, there 
is no middle ground.  I can choose to drive to work, get married, or buy a gun.  
:KDW,FDQ¶WGRKRZHYHULVWR³SDUWLDOO\FKRRVH´WRGULYHJHWPDUULHG, or buy 
a gun.  In conventional language, choice is binary.  Either you choose to do 
something, or you do not.144  This, in turn, explains why punishment in civil 
law jurisdictions is meted out solely on the basis of the binary intent/negligence 
distinction.  Intentional wrongdoing is punished more because it reveals freely 
chosen wrongdoing.145  On the other hand, negligent wrongdoing is punished 
less because the negligent actor has not chosen to do harm.146
The conceptual structure of choice also explains the attitudinal nature of the 
civil law approach to mental states.  To choose X is not merely to know or be 
aware of X.  In addition of awareness of the thing that one is choosing, to choose 
HQWDLOV WR H[HUFLVH RQH¶V ZLOO LQ D FHUWDLQ kind of way.  I choose to eat a 
cheeseburger not only because I am aware of the cheeseburger.  In addition to 
such awareness, choosing to eat the burger entails exercising my will so as to 
make the affirmative decision of eating it.  Similarly, an actor who is aware that 
a person may die has not necessarily chosen to kill that person.  In addition, the 
actor must exercise her will in a certain kind of way in order for it to be said 
WKDWVKH³FKRVH´WRNLOOWKHSHUVRQ Given that the civil law approach to mental 
states punishes actors for choosing wrongdoing and that the conceptual 
143. Weigend, supra note 132, at 928, 943.
144. I define choice in Aristotelian terms.  If the actor can do more than one thing, the actor has 
a choice even if the choice is unattractive or is the product of duress.  Thus, a coerced actor who kills 
an innocent person in order to avoid being killed chooses to kill in spite of the coercion.  That is, she 
could have chosen to die instead of saving herself by killing an innocent person.  The problem in these 
cases is not that the actor lacks choice.  Instead, the problem is that the coercer has unjustifiably and 
unattractively reduced the actor¶s choices. 
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
146. See id. § 210.4. 
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structure of choosing entails the presence of non-cognitive mental states, the 
civil law approach to mental states is appropriately described as attitudinal. 
On the other hand, thH03&¶VDSSURDFKWRmens rea focuses on cognitive 
mental states because it strives primarily to punish culpable risk creation rather 
than defective choice making.147  The logic of choice plays little to no role in 
the MPC model of mental states for the same reason that the MPC generally 
favors rules that foster risk control and minimization over victim or offender 
autonomy.148  The chief aims of the drafters of the Code were to identify and 
incapacitate dangerous offenders and to deter would-be offenders from 
engaging in future wrongdoing.149  Punishing primarily for conscious risk 
creation advances both of these aims.  On one hand, those who consciously 
create risks of harm reveal themselves as dangerous and in need of correction.  
On the other hand, the criminal law ought to be designed in a way that deters 
people from engaging in conduct that consciously creates risks of harm.  
Whether such risk-FUHDWLQJDFWRUV³DXWRQRPRXVO\FKRRVH´WRFDXVHKDUPLVQRW
really relevant under this model.  Their dangerousness is revealed by their 
conscious risk-taking regardless of their attitude toward the risk.  As a result, 
the MPC approach to mens rea emphasizes cognitive mental states such as 
awareness over non-cognitive or attitudinal mental states such as indifference 
or acceptance. 
7KH03&¶VPXOWLQDU\DSSURDFKWRmens rea can also be explained by the 
&RGH¶V HPSKDVLV RQ ULVN-minimization.150  Actors can be aware of many 
different risks.  Furthermore, actors who are aware of a certain type of risk are 
sometimes more dangerous or in need of more deterrence than those who are 
aware of a different kind of risk.  As a result, the MPC approach to mens rea
punishes different kinds of awareness in different ways, thus giving rise to a 
multinary approach to mens rea.  Being aware that conduct creates a substantial 
risk of death (recklessness) is different than being aware that conduct will 
certainly cause death (knowledge).  The different awareness in these cases is 
sometimes the basis for imposing differential punishment.151
In sum, the civil law approach to mens rea revolves around the idea of 
autonomous choice.  Choosing to engage in wrongdoing is deserving of more 
punishment than not choosing to engage in wrongdoing.  The civilian 
preference for punishing choice is the product of a system of criminal justice 
that prizes respecting autonomy over minimizing or controlling risk.  This view 
147. See id. § 2.02. 
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., id. § 2.02(2)(c), (d). 
151. See, e.g., id. §§ 210.3±210.4. 
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of criminal law as a vehicle for expressing and respecting autonomous choice 
explains why civil law approaches to mental states are generally both binary 
and attitudinal. 
Contrarily, the MPC approach to mental states prioritizes risk minimization 
over reaffirming the autonomy of the victim or offender.  This view is the 
product of a criminal justice system that aims primarily to maximize deterrence 
of dangerous activities.  This preference for maximizing deterrence and 
LQFDSDFLWDWLRQH[SODLQVZK\WKH03&¶Vmens rea model is primarily cognitive 
and multinary.  
E. Mental States in Comparative Perspective: Moving Forward 
As the previous discussion shows, MPC and civil law approaches to mental 
states differ significantly in at least two ways.  First, civil law jurisdictions favor 
a binary approach to mental states that allows for only two basic grading scales 
based on mens rea.  So-called intentional crimes are punished considerably, 
whereas so-called negligent crimes are punished significantly less.  In contrast, 
the United States is moving toward what I have called a multinary approach 
that allows for up to four basic grading scales based on mens rea.  Second, civil 
law jurisdictions tend to focus more on attitudinal mental states that 
discriminate between more and less severe grading scales based on whether the 
defendant displayed certain attitudes towards the risks that she created.  In 
contrast, the MPC focuses more on cognitive mental states in order to make 
basic grading distinctions.  What can be learned from these divergent 
approaches to mental states?  Does one model work better in some 
circumstances but not in others?  This concluding section addresses these 
questions. 
F. In Defense of a Multinary Approach to Mental States 
A multinary approach to mental states is preferable to a binary approach.  
There are both conceptual and normative reasons for preferring the multinary 
approach. 
From a descriptive perspective, the binary distinction of intent (dolus) and 
negligence (culpa) describes certain mental states as intentional when doing so 
is conceptually confusing.  Intentional conduct is purposive conduct.  While 
what civil law scholars call dolus directus of the first degree entails purposive 
conduct, the other two kinds of dolus do not.152  This is especially the case with 
dolus eventualis, as being aware of a risk of harm or being indifferent to its 
consummation is simply not the same as wanting its consummation.  Claiming 
152. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 417, 423, 424. 
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otherwise²as most civil law courts and scholars do²is confusing.  
Furthermore²and more importantly²nothing is gained by calling dolus 
eventualis a kind of intentional conduct other than forcing this mental state into 
one of the two mental states in the binary intent/culpa distinction.  As the MPC 
approach to mental states illustrates, there is conceptual breathing space for 
mental states other than intent and negligence.  As a result, it would be better 
to simply recognize that dolus eventualis is neither a kind of intent nor a kind 
of negligence.  It is its own mental state that is conceptually distinct from both 
intent and negligence. 
Normatively, the multinary approach is also preferable to the binary 
approach.  All things being equal, purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and 
negligence lie on a continuum of blameworthiness ranging from the most 
blameworthy mental state (purpose) to the mental state worthy of less 
condemnation (negligence).153  If these mental states lie on a continuum of 
blameworthiness, it would be preferable to allow for differential punishment 
GHSHQGLQJRQZKLFKPHQWDOVWDWHEHVWGHVFULEHVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWLQVWHDG
of lumping two or more of these mental states together to create a binary 
approach to mental states that affords less flexibility in making basic grading 
distinctions. 
The Hall case illustrates this quite nicely.  In terms of describing the 
GHIHQGDQW¶VFRQGXFWLWLVVWUDQJHWRGHVFULEHKLPDV³LQWHQWLRQDOO\´NLOOLQJWKH
victim.  The defendant obviously did not have the purpose of killing anyone 
when he was schussing down the ski slope.  Even if the defendant was aware 
that his conduct created a risk of death or serious bodily injury, it would be a 
stretch to describe this mental state as intentional.  Other than needless 
confusion, nothing is gained by claiming²as could plausibly be claimed in 
civilian jurisdictions²that the defendant intentionally killed the victim when 
the defendant collided with the victim. 
The normative appeal of the multinary approach to mental states may also 
be illustrated by the Hall case.  :KLOHWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VNLOOLQJRIWKHYLFWLPLV
clearly worthy of significant condemnation, it would be odd to punish this 
killing as severely as a purposeful killing.  On the other hand, it seems unfair to 
punish actors who are aware of the risk created by their conduct in the same 
way as actors who are unaware of the risks that their conduct creates.  As a 
result, it is appropriate to punish those who are aware of the risk of harm created 
by their conduct less than those who want to cause the harm but more than those 
who are unaware of the risk of harm they create.  This can easily be achieved 
under a multinary approach to mental states, such as the one adopted in the 
153. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.2±210.4. 
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MPC.  Thus, the defendant in Hall ZDVFKDUJHGZLWK³UHFNOHVVPDQVODXJKWHU´
which is punished less severely than purposeful or knowing murder but more 
harshly than negligent homicide.154
This sensible outcome is difficult to achieve if one follows a binary 
approach to mental states.  If the Hall case were tried in Spain, for example, the 
trier of fact would have only two options.  She could either convict the 
defendant of homicide committed with dolus (intent) or of negligent 
homicide.155  Since the unitary mental state of dolus encompasses both 
purposeful killings and killings with dolus eventualis, if the defendant is found 
to have acted with dolus eventualis, he will be punished as severely as if he had 
killed purposely.156  Furthermore, since the unitary mental state of culpa 
includes both conscious negligence (without indifference) and unconscious 
negligence, if the defendant is found to have acted with culpa, he will be 
punished equally regardless of whether he was aware or unaware of the risks 
that his conduct created.157  These solutions to the Hall case are objectionable.  
If the defendant in Hall was aware that his irresponsible skiing created a risk of 
death, he should be punished more severely than a skier who was unaware that 
her conduct created such risks but less severely than a skier who wanted to 
cause the death of a fellow skier.  That the binary approach to mental states 
adopted in the Spanish Penal Code²and in most civilian jurisdictions²does 
not allow for such an intuitive conclusion reveals a significant flaw in the 
approach. 
G. Attitudinal v. Cognitive Mental States in Jury and Bench Cases 
The question of whether we ought to prefer an attitudinal or a cognitive 
approach to mental states is more difficult to answer than whether we should 
favor a binary or multinary approach to mens rea.  In principle, it seems that 
the attitudinal approach is more normatively attractive.  It is plausible to argue 
that someone who is aware of the harm created by her conduct and also 
indifferent to it is more worthy of condemnation than someone who is aware of 
the risk but is not indifferent to it.158
154. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207, 210 (Colo. 2000); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. 
155. CÓDIGO PENAL § 1 arts. 138±142 (2015).  
156. See ROXIN, supra note 8, at 423, 424. 
157. Id. at 1018, 1019. 
158. It is plausible to argue, however, that an actor who is aware that her conduct creates a risk 
of harm but is indifferent towards whether it takes place is not significantly more worthy of blame than 
the actor who is similarly aware of the risk but trusts that she will be able to prevent it.  Why should 
the law favor those who consciously engage in risky undertakings while foolishly believing that harm 
will not result? 
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In spite of the prima facie normative appeal of the attitudinal approach, at 
least two serious pragmatic objections can be leveled against it.  First, it will 
often be very difficult to prove whether someone was aware of a risk but 
indifferent to it or whether she was aware but thought that she could prevent it 
and was therefore not indifferent to it.  Requiring prosecutors to prove 
indifference/acceptance in addition to awareness imposes a probative burden in 
circumstances in which it is unclear whether the benefits of doing so outweigh 
the evidentiary costs that requiring such proof creates.
Second, jurisdictions that have jury trials may be particularly disserved by 
adopting an attitudinal approach to mental states along the lines of the 
framework that is in place in civilian countries.  If the distinction between dolus 
eventualis and conscious negligence has baffled judges and scholars for 
decades, it is difficult to imagine how much added confusion it would sow in 
the minds of juries.  These reservations are buttressed by a recently published 
study that showed that laypeople are incapable of non-arbitrarily distinguishing 
between recklessness and knowledge.159  If laypeople are unable to consistently 
and fairly distinguish knowledge from recklessness, it is fair to infer that they 
will be unable to coherently distinguish between recklessness and recklessness 
with gross indifference to the value of human life.
For these reasons, adoption of a cognitive approach to mental states is 
generally preferable in countries with jury trials.  This includes all of Anglo-
America and now includes several civil law countries that have recently 
adopted a jury trial system.  In contrast, jurisdictions that only have bench trials 
may be better served by an attitudinal approach to mental states, given that this 
approach is arguably more normatively appealing than a purely cognitive one 
and that the pragmatic difficulties inherent in its implementation are easier to 
overcome if experienced lawyers are called to apply the framework as opposed 
to inexperience laypeople.
V. CONCLUSION
 This Essay compared and contrasted the American and civilian approaches 
to punishing culpable mental states.  Two important insights emerge from this 
comparative analysis.  First, it is preferable to have multiple forms of 
culpability than to have only two.  The bipartite distinction between dolus and 
culpa fails to fully make sense of our moral universe.  Second, the criminal law 
ought to take attitudinal mental states into account when making grading 
distinctions.  Nevertheless, there are significant obstacles to doing so in 
159. Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1338 (2011). 
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jurisdictions with jury trials, as the addition of attitudinal mental states may 
confuse laypeople rather than help them. 
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